

Bolton conference call with AIPAC January 6th, 2007

Bolton: ...can do is cover a couple of issues that I think may be of interest, but then I'm particularly happy to answer your questions and that's always a way to respond to what's truly on your mind. So I'll cover a few of these areas, but please feel free to ask about anything that may be of concern to you.

Let me start off first with the new UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, and what he's been up to, what we might expect him to be doing and what his prospects are. I should say Ban Ki-Moon is an unusual individual in the sense that – unusual to be in the position of Secretary-General because most of his professional diplomatic career, in one capacity or another, has been involved with the United States. He has been posted several times in this country, in Washington, he's been posted in the South Korean mission in New York. Even when he was back in Seoul, much of his career was involved in the US-South Korean relation, and that – there really is no precedent for that in the UN system until you really go back to 1945 and Trygve Lie of Norway, the first UN Secretary-General. So while I don't necessarily think that that is a reliable basis on which to forecast each and every one of his decisions, just in terms of somebody who knows the United States, whose professional life has been directed toward having a good US-South Korean relationship. He will certainly think of us not simply because we are the largest contributor to the UN or because we're a permanent member of the Security Council. He'll think of the United States because of that long professional association.

Now, having said that, let me say that the politics that led to his suggestion were really maneuvered by both the United States and China. I mean, he had plenty of other support as well, but the conventional political wisdom in NY in the months that led up to the ultimate decision were that it was Asia's turn to have the next Secretary-General. The United States didn't adhere to that. Our view was we want to have the best-qualified person from wherever in the world they come, but the overwhelming political fact of life was that it was going to be an Asian, and indeed, that's the way it turned out.

I think – and I would say this whether I were in the government or now not in the government – I think he was - of all the Asian names that were put forward – I think he's the best selection, for the reason that I said before, because of his professional background, but also because I hope that he is more likely than the rest of them to avoid the temptation of thinking that now that he's Secretary-General he's God's gift to humanity. It's a problem in NY that some secretary-generals had, and I'm hoping that Ban Ki-Moon will be immune to it.

But picking a secretary-general is a lot like a President nominating someone to the Supreme Court. You can think you have a pretty good idea of the kind of person he's going to be and the kind of job he's going to do, but once they become secretary general, they're in a different position, and a lot of predictions have been wrong in the past.

What can we tell in his early days? He's only five days on the job. I'd list a couple of positives and a couple of negatives. He has commented in a variety of press encounters that he thinks the single most important problem he wants to look at is the Israel-Palestinian

question. That's not something that is really in his remit at the present time. As secretary-general he has a role in the Quartet, which is probably something that we shouldn't have set up to begin with, but it's there, he does have a role in it. I think what he is reflecting in that comment is the prevailing conventional wisdom at the UN – that if, gee, we could only solve the Arab-Israeli problem and solve it in a particular way, then every other problem in the Middle East would disappear. Now that, of course, is ridiculous, and while I am unhappy about the comment, I wouldn't necessarily read it as a reflection of long and deep thought about the Middle East. I think it is passing on what he's hearing in briefings and the conventional wisdom, and therefore something that we need to try to work on to turn around.

He did say one thing that I thought was especially interesting in connection with the execution of Saddam Hussein and developments in Iraq in recent days. Asked about the execution of Saddam Hussein, he said, well, this is basically a matter for the decision of each member state. That's a dramatic change from his predecessor, who opined on every moral issue that came his way – Kofi Annan was against the death penalty. To me this is not a question of whether you favor the death penalty or oppose the death penalty. This is a question of the proper role of the United Nations, and more particularly the proper role of the Secretary General. I think Ban Ki-Moon is right. It is a decision for each government, each UN member, whether they favor the death penalty or don't. In our country, governed largely by State law, with some federal death penalties, it's a matter of intense debate in a democratic society. Some states have it, some states don't. And that, I think, shows the nature of how a democratic decision-making process works, and that our decision, in many respects, to have a death penalty, is for us to decide, as it is for other countries as well. I have no doubt that if Kofi Annan were still Secretary-General, he would have criticized the Iraqis for imposing the death penalty, and would have given a little speech on the international rule of law, and so on and so forth. So I thought this was a very positive sign, not because of what Ban Ki-Moon says about the death penalty, but because of the recognition that it expresses about his proper role and the role of the UN. As Secretary-General, he should be the servant of the member states. It's an inter-governmental organization. We tell the Secretariat what to do, and the Secretariat should carry it out. They're not some independent decision-making authority with their own legitimacy and power.

Ban Ki-Moon has begun the process of staffing the top levels of the UN. He has made a number of decisions. I would say overall it's kind of a mixed bag at this point. We believe that he will name an American to be Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, replacing the former Nigerian Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Gambari. This is a shift from the position the U.S. has had. For about the last fifteen years we've had the Undersecretary for Management because of the importance the United States attaches to that post in the UN reform. It was our judgment that it was time to move on to something else – not because we have any less of a priority on management reform, but because, frankly, with a variety of other changes, we thought it was important to increase American influence in the Secretariat, and to get one of the policy jobs.

Political Affairs has a direct role in the Middle East. Gambari typically gave the monthly report to the Security Council at the Council's monthly meeting on the Middle East. This person would be involved in Lebanon, and would be involved in Hariri investigation and a whole range of matters very much at the core of Middle East issues. The selection that we

think Ban Ki-Moon will announce fairly soon is a career diplomat named Lynn Pasco, currently the US ambassador in Indonesia. His background is largely Asian and Central Asian, and that's how Ban Ki-Moon met him. I've dealt with for many years. I think he's a very competent Foreign Service officer. He's risen to the top ranks of the Foreign Service as an ambassador. I don't think he's had much if any experience in Middle East issues, and therefore I don't really know what to say about his own views. I think it's important that the administration establish a very direct relationship with him, so that in that critical position, if that's what it turns out to be, that Lynn Pasco understands where American views fall.

Now there are a whole bunch of other senior appointments that are yet to be made, and that will tell us a lot more about the shape of Ban Ki-Moon's top team at the UN, and that will obviously be quite important in assessing the direction he's going to go. So, I would say he's off to a decent start, but not a great start. He's a cautious man, he's a very thorough man, and it's something that I think...he would be open to meetings, and consulting with Americans on a whole variety of issues. I think it's important that we stay in touch with him so that he's fully aware of the range of views out there.

Let me turn now to the question of Iran and what I think the situation is there. The Security Council just passed a resolution. The resolution that the Security Council passed at the end of last month imposing certain limited sanctions on Iran, obviously the product of a long effort based on Iran's refusal to comply with the earlier Security Council resolution that gave them until August 31st to cease their uranium enrichment activities. I'd have to say because I'm a private citizen and therefore a free man again, and these are my personal views, now, that this sanctions resolution is very disappointing. It is not as tough as I would have liked to have seen it. In many respects the Russians did an outstanding job from their point of view in protecting Iran, in narrowing the scope of the sanctions, in limiting the effectiveness, I think, of many of the things that we wanted to try and do to prevent the Iranians from continuing to make progress on their nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

I think the Iranian reaction to the sanctions resolution has been very telling in that respect, although they've passed a resolution in parliament to re-evaluate their relation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, they have not rejected the sanctions resolution, they have not done anything more dramatic, such as withdrawing from the nonproliferation treaty, or throwing out inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which I actually hoped they would do – that that kind of reaction would produce a counter-reaction that actually would be more beneficial to us.

So I think the Iranians' cautious reaction so far shows that they're not terribly worried by this sanctions resolution, and that the Russians have counseled them, that they actually came away better than might have been expected and that therefore their reaction needs to be low key. We'll still have to see. I think that needs to play out a little bit more, but if in fact that remains the Iranian reaction, then I think we're going to confront very quickly the fact that this resolution is not going to slow them down or stop them in their continuing pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. And that's discouraging, obviously, but something that I think is going to require a lot of attention and it's going to have to compete with the obvious priority that'll be given to Iraq here over the next several weeks. It's obviously something that the Iranians will pay close attention to - what we do in Iraq – and that could have an impact on

them, as well, if the President moves in the direction that it's looking like he will move in, to increase American forces in order to do more to suppress the terrorist activity that's being carried out in Iraq.

There's also obviously the continuing problem of Lebanon, and although it's been quiet there in the past few weeks, I don't think there's been any change in the intention of the Iranians and the Syrians acting through Hezbollah to bring down the democratic government. I'm not quite sure I can fully explain why the relative level of quiet. There may be some maneuvering going on, but this is something that even though it has not been terribly active – not been in the news - I don't think that we can turn our attention away from, because the strategic priority for Iran and Syria and Hezbollah to take out the Saniora government, I think, remains very high, and that I think we will see more activity on that front in the fairly near future.

I guess I would just close here with a general observation about the situation in the UN as a whole, in connection with Israel and the US relationship with Israel. We were seeing in the months coming to the end of last year, I think, an increased willingness on the part of the Arab League and many other states to use the General Assembly as a forum to attack Israel. When they were faced with American vetoes of resolutions condemning Israel in the Security Council, they took their case to the General Assembly, where there's no veto by the United States or the other permanent members, and where there's a guaranteed anti-American, anti-Israeli majority.

Whether this is a trend that's going to grow, I think we can't tell, but I'm very worried about it. And I'm worried that because of their frustration with our ability to stop these efforts in the Security Council, that the level of activity, which could be quite injurious, in the General Assembly, is going to increase. That's something that I think we all need to keep our eyes on in the months ahead, and I think shows that the general level of anti-Israel bias in the organization as a whole has sadly still not diminished or been eliminated, so that this continuing problem of efforts to stigmatize Israel, to isolate it, to isolate the United States along with it, is something that we're going to have to, unfortunately, to pay a great deal of attention to.

Howard, with that, if that's acceptable, I'd like to stop there, but as I said at the beginning, I would welcome any questions, really on any subject that the participants have.

JM: Thank you, Ambassador Bolton. Howard just stepped out to take a call. This is John Mizener, Director of National Affairs here. Thank you for that thoughtful presentation and with that, Nelson, why don't we open up the floor to questions?

Nelson: Thank you. At this time I would like to remind everyone, if you would like to pose a question, please press star and then the number one on your keypad. We'll pause for just a moment to compile the Q&A roster. [pause, beeps] Our first question comes from Pamela Geller-Oshrey [of Atlas Shrugs]

P G-O: Hi, Ambassador Bolton. I want to thank you for all your hard work and all the great deeds that you did on behalf of the free man. My question concerns the continuing

Islamization of the UN and our ability to at the very least contain it if not stop it. The organization of the Islamic countries – it's like the EU, the Commonwealth, the G8 – and they vote as a bloc, and it's more than a religion, it's a political project. I mean if there was an organization of Christian Conference there would be hell to pay. Is there any thought to somehow stopping this movement within the UN?

Bolton: You know, it's a very good question. Although the UN, for years has relied on a series of regional groups of countries to aggregate their preferences and make their voices louder, you have a number of anomalies that relate to the Middle East that are not found elsewhere. You have not only the Arab League as a regional group, but the OIC, which is obviously broader than the Arab League, but whose policies on the Middle East are functionally the same, if not more problematic in many respects. I think this is part of the kind of institutional bias against Israel that's locked into the UN, if you will. And it's a very serious problem, because many of these countries that have enormous problems of their own, that ought to be the subject for example of human rights groups, for the abuses of human rights that they perpetrate on their own people, are able to use the power that they accumulate from being part of these groups, to single out Israel and to put Israel and the United States continually on the defensive, responding to their initiatives, and not being able to make progress on things we prefer to do. So this is an enormous problem, and I'm glad you pointed that out, because it sounds like – I don't know what the NY analog to being "inside the beltway" is – but it has much more profound implications than just internal UN debate. This is something that provides these countries with a forum, with a stage where they can magnify their opinions in a very significant way.

P G-O: Thank you.

JM: Next question, Nelson.

Nelson: Thank you. Our next question is coming from M S of Wilmot, Illinois. Please go ahead.

MS: Good morning, Ambassador Bolton, and from the bottom of my heart, our thanks for your actions, particularly during the Lebanese war. I was in Israel during that war, and there was a great deal of gratitude for your steadfastness with the U.S. and our ally in the Mideast. I wanted to ask you about the Security Council. Who do you see as likely (additions?) to the Security Council and am I correct in viewing that group - the Security Council itself – as really being key to the direction of the UN?

Bolton: Well, that's an important point, and on January the first five new nonpermanent members came on the Security Council, and that means we're going to have a different council, and in some respects a much more difficult environment for the United States and for Israel on Middle East issues. I won't go through all of the replacements, but I'll just name two that I think are quite significant. Tanzania, one of the African members, has been replaced by South Africa, the strongest sub-Saharan country along with Nigeria – obviously a country that's had a leadership role in the nonaligned movement for many, many decades, closely aligned with the Arab League, in many respects, a kind of historical foreign policy since the fall of apartheid. I would have thought that Tanzania during its tenure would have

been more problematic, but it was actually fairly cooperative as these things go. I think South Africa – this is the first time, by the way that South Africa has ever been on the Security Council. I hadn't even realized that until last fall. They were not permitted to join during the apartheid years, but even after the fall of apartheid they had not sought to be a nonpermanent member until this year. So this is a huge shift on the council, and I think probably in the direction of the Arab League position. The other shift that is going to be very significant is that Japan has come off the council as a nonpermanent member and been replaced by Indonesia, another Muslim country. I think it's the largest Muslim country in the world, actually. The difference between Japan, a close, long-time American ally and Indonesia, a Muslim prominent member of the nonaligned movement, I think is going to be quite dramatic. So it's been tough enough in the council in recent years, I think these shifts and some others are going to make it more difficult and more challenging over the next two years.

JM: Let's go to the next question, Nelson.

Nelson: Thank you. Our next question is coming from ZK of Chicago, Illinois. Please go ahead.

ZK: Mr. Ambassador, let me echo the thanks that have been given to you by the previous questioners. My question relates to Iranian policy. Some of the analyses that I've been reading recently are that the Iranian president is perhaps losing some popularity, that there are varying power centers that are in competition with one another, and that perhaps the best alternative with respect to nuclear policy is not for the US or the UN or the West to particularly press that issue at this point and let things hopefully shake out more favorably, and I'm wondering what your reaction is to that thought.

Bolton: Right. Well the internal politics of Iran are very complicated and I think, largely opaque, even to people who are very knowledgeable in the country. I would say this, and I've watched this issue over the last six years, on the question particularly of Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. And I can say this with a very high degree of confidence. Whatever the shifting moods are in the internal Iranian political debate, and there are different views on what are for them fundamentally domestic issues – the question of religion and economic policy and things like that – we have never detected any significant difference among the top Iranian leadership on the question of their pursuit of nuclear weapons. So whatever the vagaries of the internal debate about how strict the Islamic religious rule will be in Iran, on the point about their desire to have a deliverable nuclear weapons capability, we have not seen a conflict between moderates and hardliners. Now a lot of people look for – if I thought there were a political way to take advantage of such a split, I'd be happy to try and do it, but the uniformity of the top leadership in their desire to get a nuclear weapons capability, I think, has been really quite remarkable. And in any organization with human beings there are going to be personality conflicts, differences over this and that, and I think that's to be expected. But in terms of their strategic objective, they've been pursuing the strategic objective of nuclearization for twenty years and there's no sign that I can detect that they've wavered from that in the slightest.

JM: Next question, please.

Nelson: OK, our next question is coming from L S in Los Angeles, California. Please go ahead.

LS: Ambassador Bolton, many thanks. It is a great pity that we could not somehow clone your personality and your achievements amongst many more in the Israeli and the American governments. My question is as follows: Would it not perhaps make some sense for the democratic countries around the world to withdraw their support of the UN and create a new power base that would somehow have more of a fit that would match our requirements?

Bolton: Well, I can certainly say that after working very hard for about a year and a half on the UN reform effort, that the strategy that we've followed of seeking incremental reform in the UN system has essentially come to an end. I don't see that we've accomplished all that much. That puts us in a long line of unsuccessful efforts to reform the UN, and I think to change the organization we need much more fundamental changes. I won't get into that subject here because our time is limited, but another option, obviously is not simply continuing to try to fix the dysfunctional UN organization, but looking to competitors, and I think there are a lot of ways to solve international problems. There are a lot of organizations. There are alternatives to the UN now, there might well be other alternatives such as the caucus of democracy idea. We believe pretty strongly in our country in the value of the competition of ideas in the marketplace, and I think that increased competition in the market for international problem solving would be a good thing for us and it might even be a good thing for the UN. But I think that's part of the diplomacy that the US has to practice, explaining to many of its good friends, particularly in Europe, that the UN is not the only venue to solve international problems, and indeed it's not in our interest to have that to be widely perceived, and so looking at whether the ad hoc groups and coalitions of the willing or other more structured organizations that could serve as alternatives to the UN – I think is something we should pursue.

JM: Next question.

Nelson: Thank you. Our next question is coming from R B of Kentfield, CA. Please go ahead.

RB: Thank you for being with us, Mr. Ambassador, not just this morning but throughout your diplomatic careers – really appreciate it. I wanted to know just how closely the UN has been monitoring the agreements on the Lebanese-Israeli border and if they are violated, what are they really prepared to do about it?

Bolton: I have to say I'm going to give you a pretty discouraging answer on that point. I think that the enhanced UNIFIL, which was agreed to with a lot of fanfare as part of UN resolution 1701 has not been successful in really fully accomplishing the mission that we wanted to give to it. I think there is no doubt that Syria and Iran have very substantially resupplied, re-armed Hezbollah. I think that these resupplies have come across the Syrian-Lebanese border and the UNIFIL people have done essentially nothing about it. We know of many reports in – and by the way, those shipments across the Lebanese-Syrian border have been reported by the UN itself. This is not something that comes only from the United States

Terje Roed-Larsen, the representative of the Secretary-General on this issue has reported that to the Security Council based on his own investigations. I think that the possibility of Hezbollah then moving those arms back into southern Lebanon – not in military formation such as we saw before, but moving them back in very effectively – is almost certainly going on now. We know of several instances where UNIFIL in effect finding this under way did not take any steps to stop it, called the Lebanese armed forces, which unfortunately didn't do anything about it, either. So in many respects not only has Hezbollah botched a campaign of demonstrations and subversions directly against the Siniora government to try and overthrow it, but it's rebuilding its capacity to, if need be, use military force against the government, and also obviously use it against Israel. So it could well be we're coming to a day of reckoning here on resolution 1701 and whether that cessation of hostilities that the resolution established between Hezbollah and Israel is going to continue to remain acceptable. It's obviously something we need to watch very closely, and I think I would hope that the United States in the near future begins to take the next step that we made a conscious decision not to take in 1701, which is to start the process of actually disarming Hezbollah. The fact they're being re-armed now is dangerous enough, but the unspoken premise of 1701 was that first you stop them from getting external assistance by imposing an arms embargo, but then the next step, without which the resolution itself doesn't take you very far, is to disarm Hezbollah, and we have not done anything on that. I think we're at the point we've got to move to that second step.

JM: Nelson, let's do two more questions, please.

Nelson: Thank you. Our next question is coming from A L of San Antonio, Texas. Please go ahead.

AL: Thank you very much, Ambassador Bolton for your outstanding service on behalf of our great country. In my opinion there are two types of diplomacy: diplomacy of Churchill or Chamberlain. Your diplomatic efforts follow in the tracks of Churchill. Even if you served for a relatively short period of time, as the UN ambassador, history will record all of your positive and important accomplishments. You will be known as a champion for the United States at the United Nations. My question has to do with your proposed replacement as ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad. He is a Sunni Muslim. In your opinion, will this help or hurt our relationship with Israel and the other countries in the Middle East.

Bolton: Let me say, and I really should have said to everybody, I'm so grateful for all these kind words you've had for me, and I really – I do deeply appreciate it. I've known Zal for probably 15 or 16 years. Back in the Bush 41 administration he was focused largely on Afghanistan then, as we moved to try and topple the remaining communist regime that had been installed there as the Soviet Union pulled out. He's a very bright man. He's very hardworking. I have to say I've not had contact with him outside of his current responsibilities, first as our ambassador in Afghanistan and then as ambassador in Iraq, but these were two of the toughest assignments that I think the President could ask anybody to pursue, and in very dangerous – physically dangerous environments, I might add – for Zal, and it required him to be separated from his family for long periods of time. So he's given a lot personally to serve the United States, and I think that's something that's really quite honorable on his part. I have to say, I've never talked with him about Middle East issues,

and so I don't have any sense of where he would come out on that, and I can say for myself, if in fact he's the nominee – and I have to tell you I don't actually know whether he is or not, maybe the President's announcing it right now, but I don't know myself, but if in fact he turns out to be the nominee, I will support him in every way I can in the transition, including – at whatever length he chooses – to sit down with him and go over all these issues and then if in fact he does go up to NY, I'm available to him at any time, if he wants to consult, or whatever. So that's certainly a contribution I'm happy to make, and I hope all of you will be – whoever my successor is – will be in touch with him and talk to him about the issues. It's very important. We do not have foreign policy in the United States made only in the State Department. We have a populist kind of foreign policy making style. It's very important to be in touch with officials. I know with Howard and the rest of you, you'll continue to do it. I just stress this is something that is really very important in internal policy formation.

JM: Let's make this the last question, Nelson, please.

Nelson: Thank you. Our final question is coming from E K of Los Angeles, California. Please go ahead.

EK: Good morning. Thank you very much, Ambassador Bolton, for your support of Israel and on your outstanding service. Very quickly, number one, there's something called the Jerusalem Summit in Israel, and one of its key goals is to – and referring to some other Angelino's point about is there any hope for a UN competitor – so a) to continue with his question, is that something that is worth pursuing if you're familiar with it at all, b) I'm very concerned about the fact that, with Iran on the horizon, somehow Israel always ends up being the bone that is thrown in some form of an appeasement to the Arab world, which is very concerned with Iran, c) your view on what to do about the Qassam rockets in Israel.

Bolton: Right. Well, I think on the democratic alternative to the United Nations, people have been talking about it, speculating about it for some time, and I think if the idea is worth pursuing, it'll be worth pursuing as we try and make it more concrete. And I think for a lot of people at the State Department or even at the White House, trying to make it into reality is something that they could use a lot of assistance from the outside on, so I think what people should be focusing on is not the advisability of the idea, which I think is hard to argue with, but to think, how do we turn it from a concept into a reality. I think that would go a long way toward helping our government articulate the idea more effectively. I think there's always a risk in diplomacy, that tradeoffs of the kind you're talking about are offered up, and many in the Arab League offer that tradeoff up all the time. The Iranians would gladly trade, I think, for example, reduce the interference in Iraq for a free pass on their nuclear program, and while I'd love to reduce Iranian influence among the Shiites in southern Iraq, there's no way we should give them the quid pro quo of not continuing very vigorously to try and stop their nuclear weapons program. This really comes, with respect to Israel, back to the point I made first about the conventional wisdom in NY, that everything would be fine if only we could solve the Arab-Israeli problem, and that is the sort of motivator that says, well don't worry about this or that or the other thing, don't worry so much about Iran's nuclear weapons program, focus on Israel, and it's just delusional. That's the only thing you can say about it. But I would expect that we would see a lot of that in the international debate, because it's a view that so widely held outside the United States. And I think with respect to the rocketing,

you know, we're in a very difficult time now with the government of Israel having its own domestic political circumstances being the way they are and with Hamas and Fatah engaged in their own civil war, in effect, in the occupied territories, and with Hezbollah re-arming – being re-armed by Iran and Syria – in the north, and it's a very troubling situation. There's just simply no doubt about it – not a time, I think, to emphasize making concessions on any of the key issues.

JM: Ambassador Bolton, thank you very much for joining us. Before we formally thank the Ambassador, I just want to take a second to remind everyone on this call that the Early Bird discount for the AIPAC Policy Conference ends in just ten days. The conference is March 11th through 13th in Washington. You just heard the Ambassador outline and discuss the many pressing issues that surround us and we need to ask ourselves, if our community doesn't come together to show our solidarity in views on these issues, who will? We hope that you join us and that your passion and urgency regarding these issues enable you to make the decision to join us at Policy Conference. We believe you will find it among the most rewarding three days of the year. And you can of course register and get discounts at our website on hotels. We'd like to thank Ambassador Bolton for joining us today. The Ambassador did an extraordinary job at the UN. Many of you – all of you – on this call expressed your gratitude. He was there to defend America's interests, to protect us all, in a principled manner. So from the hundreds of politically active American Zionist Call Club members of AIPAC, we want to thank you for your service, for your seeing the world as it is, for challenging the orthodoxy, and for your extraordinary leadership and friendship to the pro-Israel community and to AIPAC. We just want to say again, Ambassador, thank you for all that you've done and for joining us today.

Bolton: Many thanks. I'm sure we'll be working together.

JM: Absolutely. Thank you everybody for being on the call today.